the Suez Canal in July 1956, leaders in Britain and France plotted his overthrow, envisioning a joint invasion with Israel, whose Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, believed Arab countries would make peace only by recognizing Israel's military superiority. Cross-border incursions by Arab Fedayeen into Israeli settlements and Israel's attacks on Arab villagers, and especially on Egyptian military outposts in Gaza in 1955, had already raised tensions between the two countries. But it was Egypt's military build-up, its blockade of the Straits of Tiran leading into the Gulf of Aqaba, and Nasser's promise of victory that prompted Israel's invasion of the Sinai peninsula on October 29, 1956 . As British planes bombed Egyptian airfields, Nasser pulled his troops from the Sinai, allowing the IDF to occupy most of the peninsula by November 3. British and French forces intervened in the Canal Zone but failed to bring about Nasser's ouster. A UN-sponsored ceasefire was achieved by November 8.
Most Security Council members joined Arab countries in condemning the invasion. Fearful that the Soviets might use it as a means of gaining influence in the Arab world, the Eisenhower administration pressured Israel to remove its forces from Egyptian territory, but stipulated that the Gulf of Aqaba remain open to Israeli ships and UN troops be stationed in the Sinai and Gaza Strip to prevent Fedayeen incursions. After the IDF withdrew in early 1957 the border was quiet for almost a decade.
Nasser's resolve in the face of the Anglo-Franco-lsraeli invasion enhanced his prestige in the Arab world. As the Soviets rebuilt Egypt's military, he intensified his rhetoric: Israel is an alien presence in the midst of Arab territory created and sustained by Western imperialism, and Palestine can be liberated only through a unified Arab front. His 1966 defense pact with Syria preceded Israeli-Syrian clashes in a demilitarized zone in the spring of 1967. Responding to reports of an Israeli military build-up in its north, Nasser reimposed a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, replaced UN troops in the Sinai with two divisions of Egyptian soldiers, and concluded a defense treaty with Jordan in late May, providing Israel with a casus belli. He underestimated Israel's military capability and did not anticipate its attack on June 5, which destroyed Egypt's air force and routed the exposed Egyptian forces in the Sinai, most of which it captured within three days. After fighting broke out in Jerusalem, Israel quickly overpowered the light Jordanian forces, occupying East Jerusalem and the West Bank by June 8. The same day an American reconnaissance ship was hit by Israeli bombs and torpedoes that killed thirty-four American sailors. Israel claimed mistaken identification, but officers on board claimed that Israel's attack was a deliberate attempt to conceal its operations against Syria. After another three-day offensive, Israel captured the Golan Heights and a ceasefire with Syria went into effect on June 11. The defeat of the combined Arab forces was devastating, with over 15,000 Arab soldiers killed-perhaps many more-compared to Israel's loss of 750.
The Israeli victory was hailed in the Western world since Nasser was viewed as proSoviet and Israel had skillfully portrayed the Arabs as aggressors who forced its preemptive action. Its real victory was not its damage to Arab military capacity-this was quickly restored with Soviet assistance-but capture of territory later used for political and economic ends, a public relations bonanza bringing increased Western support and Jewish immigration, and defeat of a popular brand of Arab nationalism, a powerful ideological adversary. But there is little to support the charge that Nasser was preparing an invasion that justified Israel's strike. U.S. intelligence reports to Israelis in late May indicated that Egypt had no plans for attack and that Israel would prevail in any case, an assessment subsequently confirmed by Israeli chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin.
Although Security Council Resolution 242 (November 1967) called for mutual recognition of all states in the region and Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, Arab countries were unwilling to negotiate with Israel after the humiliating defeat. Hostilities continued in a war of attrition, particularly between Israel and Egypt during the early 1970s. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, planned another war, not to destroy Israel-Western powers would not allow that-but to secure a more balanced treatment from the Americans. On October 6, 1973. Egyptian and Syrian forces surprised the Israeli army in the Sinai and Golan Heights. After initial Arab successes, the IDF halted the Syrian advance by October 9 and, resupplied by massive American arms shipments, stopped the Egyptians by October 14. Gulf Arab countries responded by placing an embargo on oil shipments to the United States. After the IDF broke through Syrian lines in the Golan and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army in the Canal Zone, a cease-fire, brokered by the United States and the USSR, went into effect on October 24.
In this war, Israel lost over 2,500 soldiers, and while combined Arab losses were greater, respect for Arab military capability was heightened. Diplomatic gains in the late 1970s indicated the PLO's willingness to accept a two-state solution of the conflict, but compromise on territory in the West Bank and Golan Heights and negotiations with the PLO were opposed by the Israeli government of Menachem Begin. After intense fighting in the summer of 1981, both sides agreed to a cessation of cross-border hostilities, but Begin and his defense minister, Ariel Sharon, planned another invasion to destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon. A June 3 assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador to Britain by a radical Palestinian group opposed to PLO policy was followed by an Israeli air raid on Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, leaving over 200 dead. After the PLO shelled northern Israel in response, killing four people, Israel invaded Lebanon on June 6, devastating Palestinian population centers in the south and forcing a large exodus of Lebanese northward into Beirut. Israeli aircraft downed more than eighty Syrian airplanes and destroyed Syrian missile batteries, causing Syria to accept a ceasefire on June 11.
The IDF was soon on the outskirts of West Beirut, which it besieged for a two-month period with artillery and air attacks that killed several thousand civilians. Entrenched PLO fighters foiled an Israeli attempt to enter West Beirut in early August, and after a continuous Israeli aerial bombardment on August 12, President Reagan prevailed upon the Israeli government to halt the slaughter. The Americans then arranged an evacuation of nearly 12,000 PLO fighters and 2,500 Syrian soldiers in late August, overseen by a multinational force. The assassination of the Lebanese president, Bashir Gemayel, on September 14 was followed by an Israeli occupation of West Beirut and the massacre of at least 2,400 Palestinians by Israel's Phalangist allies.
It is estimated that at least 85 percent of the 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians killed in the June-August war, many by U.S.-supplied cluster and phosphorus bombs, were civilians. Those who claim that Israel was justified in destroying PLO bases in Lebanon overlook the disproportionate number of civilian casualties, the fact that the PLO had ceased its cross-border raids and had shown willingness to accept a two-state solution, and that it was Israel's bombing of refugee camps that reopened hostilities. Arguably, Israel's aggression failed not only the test of jus in bello but jus ad bellum, and despite its government's propaganda* about combating terrorists, of all Israel's wars, this drew the most international and domestic criticism. Although the PLO's military presence in Lebanon was reduced, the IDF did not destroy the organization nor its political influence among Palestinians, and the continued occupation of southern Lebanon earned Israel enemies among Lebanon's Shiite population.
The Arab-Israeli conflict has been one of the more intractable problems throughout 20th-century politics, and as the 21st century gets underway, it continues to pose the greatest threat to world peace. While the five wars have occasionally prompted greater realism, none has solved the basic problems caused by the forceful establishment of a Jewish state in the middle of the Arab world. It is not surprising that the belligerents should resort to violence; indeed, British officers predicted in 1919 that the Zionist program could only succeed through the force of arms. Some might view this as a legitimate, if regrettable, means of securing the Zionist ideal, but others see it as the inevitable outcome of usurping Arab territory at the expense of the Palestinians. While a peaceful resolution of the conflict is a distinct possibility, deep-seated attachments to territory, past atrocities, and an explosive mix of determination and outrage make long-range predictions tenuous. 
